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The Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity:
A Synthetic View and Critical Analysis of Welfare
State Crisis*

THOMAS O. HUEGLIN

Wilfrid Laurier University

1. Life After Affluence
In 1965 Robert Lane heralded a new "politics of consensus in an age of
affluence." On the basis of growth and welfare security in a managed
economy, there would be an increase in mutual trust, relaxation in class
awareness, and a decline of religion, racial tension and political
alienation in general.1 Ten years later, Samuel Huntington was still
speculating that a postindustrial society would be characterized by
widespread affluence, but he was much more sceptical about the
subsidence of political conflict. He foresaw that new intra-class
cleavages would occur in conjunction with postmaterial value change,
that an enormous expansion of political participation and mobilization
would make postindustrial societies extraordinarily difficult to govern,
and that the "eighteenth-century" institutions of the centralized
nation-state would become enmeshed with a new sociopolitical
environment of fragmentation and unrest. His only hope was that
postmaterial society would not emerge in such a way and to such an
extent as its theorists predicted, and hence would not need to be
contained by a rather unpleasant neo-authoritative form of government.2
Another decade later, the major concern is no longer with
postindustrial unrest stemming from affluence, but with the
* This article evolved from a graduate seminar co-taught with Richard Simeon at
Queen's University. Critical support from Hans Kastendiek, John McMenemy, Claus
Offe, Reg Whitaker, David Wolfe, and the anonymous reviewers of this JOURNAL,
helped me through various stages of revision.
1 "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," American Political Science
Review 59 (1965), 874-95.
2 "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" Comparative Politics 6 (1974),
163-91.
Thomas O. Hueglin, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University,
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XX:2 (June/juin 1987).
Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada
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destabilizing consequences of economic and welfare state crisis.3 At
what is presumably the end of the postwar period of growth and
affluence, the Western industrial world has entered an age of scarcity4
characterized by a painful awareness of the limits of growth and
opportunity in society, government, and the economy. Societies are
haunted by structural unemployment and the decline of life chances. To
find a job matching one's capabilities and ambitions can no longer be
taken for granted. Governments struggle with unprecedented budget
deficits which have shaken the previous belief in the universality of
social safety nets. And the national economies of the industrialized West
not only live with the potential threat of serious resource shortages, but
also have to grapple with stiffened competition in nearly saturated
markets at home and abroad.
Of course, there have been winners and losers under these new
conditions of economic constraint. Some countries have recovered from
the 1981-1982 recession more quickly than others, and some economic
sectors have been restructured successfully, while others continue to be
threatened by the prospects of lasting deindustrialization. What
characterizes the new age of scarcity, then, is not so much an overall
collapse of economic growth—although the growth rates of the 1950s and
1960s will hardly be reached again—but the general perception that
economic expansion has become more difficult and that success is no
longer open to everyone.
If this is scarcity only in relative terms, its sociopolitical
consequences are nevertheless real. Class conflict has once more
become more persistent. Strikes for shorter working hours and plant
occupations are now responses to the threats of unemployment and
poverty caused by industrial restructuring and robotization. On the
other hand, new forms of mobilization and conflict have emerged which
cut across the trenches of class conflict. Ecological and peace
movements attempt to prevent the scope of politics being reduced again
to the imperatives of national economic efficiency. And the efforts to
regain such efficiency have replaced traditional capital-labour conflicts
with a new pattern of socioeconomic confrontation: winning sectors,
sunshine regions and the employed segment of the working force versus
declining sectors, rustbelt regions and the unemployed. With painful
choices of distribution to be made, and the agenda of the political
engineers geared to the authoritative allocation of restructured industrial
resources, the intervention state itself has become the central site of
conflict and confrontation. Spurred by the previous promises of
affluence and participation, the potential winners demand increasing
3 See Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984).
4 See "Politics and Scarcity," Special Issue of International Political Science Review 4
(1983).

Abstract. A general perception of crisis at the end of the postwar period of growth has
spawned two types of theoretical response: while a conservative theory of overload
focusses on ungovernability caused by postmaterialist value change, radical analysis
points to the structural contradictions of the welfare and intervention state. This article
suggests that the current crisis is characterized by postmaterialist persistence and
structural contradictions under the conditions of economic constraint. It examines
polarization and potential mobilization of fragmented postindustrial societies in the
context of neo-conservative politics, and it suggests a regime of economic dualism and/or
corporatism as the most likely outcome.
Resume. La crise telle que percue generalement depuis la fin de la periode de croissance
des annees d'apres-guerre a suscite deux types d'explication: celle de la theorie
conservatrice qui met l'accent sur le phenomene de l'ingouvernabilite et du changement
vers des valeurs post-materialistes, et celle de l'analyse radicale qui fait ressortir les
contradictions structurelles de l'interventionnisme d'etat et de l'fitat providence. Le
present article caracterise la crise actuelle a la fois par la persistance des valeurs
post-materialistes et par l'existence de contradictions structurelles inherentes aux
conditions de l'economie. II examine la polarisation sociale et les possibilites de
^mobilisation au sein des societes post-industrielles fragmentees et ce, dans le contexte des
politiques neo-conservatrices, et il propose un regime d'economie mixte et/ou de
corporatisme comme etant Tissue la plus vraisembable.

state intervention on behalf of economic recovery, while the losers
expect welfare payments to flow as always.
Can the "eighteenth-century" institutions of the nation-state and
those of the competitive market system (which are nineteenth-century)
cope with the structural and attitudinal conflicts of the twenty-first
century? A rapidly expanding body of crisis literature has focussed on
two types of answers to this question.
Overload Crisis
According to the orthodox view, there is a crisis of governability which
is the result of "exaggerated demands" and "excessive democracy" in
postmaterialist societies. Again the central focus is the state itself.
Because of its universalist commitment to social safety and equity, the
welfare and intervention state reduces the incentives to work; and
because of the fiscal burden and regulatory constraint placed upon the
market economy, business loses its incentive to invest. The main
consequences are economic decline and fiscal crisis. While the social
consequences of industrial restructuring and budget cutting are
considered "normal" adjustments to the dynamic of economic change,
the explanation of crisis focusses on attitudinal change: pampered by a
long period of prosperity, industrial societies have developed
postmaterialist values, leading them to resist necessary adjustment to
leaner times and to expect too much from their governments. A
temporary disjunction between postmaterialist expectations and
possible achievement is seen as the root of overload crisis, and
overregulation as the cause of both ungovernability and economic
stagnation. If postmaterialist attitudes can be restrained along with the
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excesses of state intervention, another period of growth seems within reach. Accordingly, conservative overload analysts advocate
deregulation and the readjustment of overdrawn expectations during a
necessary period of investment-oriented restructuring of capitalist
economies.5
Structural Crisis
Contrary to this focus on attitudinal change and overload, radical
analysis on the left argues that the present crisis stems from the
structural contradictions of the capitalist system itself. Overregulation
and overload are not the primary cause of this crisis, but merely one
aspect and manifestation of it. The contradictory nature of the capitalist
welfare state is this: its socioeconomic stability rests on the fulfillment of
two basic functions, accumulation and legitimation. The more private
accumulation is achieved, the more public legitimization will be
demanded. It is not coincidental, therefore, that the postwar expansion
of the Keynesian welfare state occurred parallel to the long period of
growth and prosperity.6 Feeling threatened by the squeeze on profitable
accumulation, capitalism has nevertheless become dependent on the
legitimizing function of welfare spending. The "embarrassing secret"
and contradiction of capitalism is that while it "cannot coexist with,
neither can it exist without, the welfare state." 7
At the same time, however, when the state became increasingly
involved in welfare spending, it also had to intervene on behalf of the
economy itself, as the limits of postwar expansion became more and
more apparent. The affluent state could generate the means for lavish
welfare programmes from the surpluses of economic growth. It must
now, under the conditions of economic stagnation, spend at both ends.
One important manifestation of this is the current fiscal crisis of the
state. But while neo-Marxists almost seem to agree with their
neo-conservative colleagues that this fiscal crisis stems from a
proliferation of expanding demands, they differ markedly as to the
underlying social causes. First, they argue that the process of industrial
restructuring brings forth socioeconomically induced need rather than
exaggerated demands, so that the costs of necessary welfare
(legitimation) inevitably grow with the likewise costly efforts to rekindle
5 See Nigel Ashford, "The Neo-Conservatives," Government and Opposition 16
(1981), 353-79; Michael J. Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The
Crisis of Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1975); Anthony King,
"Overload: Problems of Governing in the 1970s," Political Studies 23 (1975), 284-96;
Richard Rose, "Ungovernability: Is there Fire Behind the Smoke?" Political Studies
27 (1979), 351-70; and critically, Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, esp.
chap. 2.
6 See Ian Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State (London: Macmillan,
1979), 126-36.
7 Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, 153 (author's emphasis).
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business confidence and a healthy investment climate. Second, while
much of the conventional wisdom about the detrimental effects of
government spending on economic efficiency is revealed as
conservative ideology, the actual accumulation of large budget deficits
appears much less invoked by the growth of social expenditures than by
the increase in supply side incentives and—in the case of the Reagan
administration—military spending as a substitute for socially targeted
Keynesianism. And the much deplored disincentives to work and invest
are finally identified as inevitable side effects rather than causal agents
of the current crisis: as attitudinal responses to the contradictory needs
for regulatory intervention in the stagnating process of accumulation.8
The Main Argument: A Synthetic Approach
Contrary to the suggestions of overload analysts, the current crisis is not
just a dilemma of attitudinal change and overregulation, and it cannot be
rectified by a painful but necessary process of readjustment. Likewise,
radical analysts tend to neglect the impact of postmaterialist value
change on the prospects of capitalist crisis management. The underlying
hypothesis of this article is that it is the persistence of postmaterialist
attitudes and of deepening structural contradictions which makes
advanced industrial societies so difficult to govern. A common
denominator of both types of crisis theory is the general assumption that
the postwar era of exceptional growth and prosperity has come to an
end. Consequently, this article will first reformulate some of the key
arguments in the environmental context of a crisis of scarcity.
Exceptional growth during the age of affluence has made further growth
increasingly difficult, and the global expansion of capitalist
accumulation has exhausted both available resources and potential new
markets. Under such conditions of scarcity capitalist systems have to
restructure their given industrial resources instead of adding new ones.
An already visible consequence is the growing polarization of
postindustrial societies. However, potential mobilization seems to be
contained successfully by the crisis management of neo-conservative
governments. These patterns of structural change will be examined in
the context of economic restructuring efforts in the United States,
Britain and West Germany. Finally, it will be argued that as these efforts
can only be partially successful, postindustrial societies will be divided
8 See James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's, 1973),
esp. 1-12; Ramesh Mishra, The Welfare State in Crisis (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984),
72-78; David Cameron, "Does Government Cause Inflation? Taxes, Spending, and
Deficits," in Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Mayer (eds.), The Politics of Inflation,
and Economic Stagnation (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 224-79;
Vicente Navarro, "The 1980 and 1984 U.S. Elections and the New Deal," in Ralph
Miliband et al. (eds.), Socialist Register 1985186 (London: Merlin, 1986), 186-91; Offe,
Contradictions of the Welfare State, 263-66.
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into a restored core of economic efficiency, and a periphery of
socioeconomic marginalization. The most likely scenario for the
foreseeable future seems to be a politics of fragmentation which tries to
stabilize bifurcated postindustrial societies by a strategy of economic
dualism and/or corporatist modes of conflict regulation.
2. A Crisis of Scarcity
If the development of market capitalism has always been accompanied
by state interventionism, and the stability of liberal societies has always
depended on their protection from the "whims of the market," 9 why
should this structural contradiction now lead to a particularly disruptive
welfare state/ungovernability/fiscal crisis? One important answer may
indeed lie in the preceding phase of exceptional growth and stability
which heightened expectations while exhausting the potential for further
expansion. Having now returned to the "normalcy" of capitalist
development, Lane's vision of consensual affluence may have been
nothing but a short-lived dream.
Another important answer must be seen in the historically
accelerating growth of direct state intervention and the uncontrolled
proliferation of non-market mechanisms and organizations at the same
time. Capitalism finds itself in the role of the sorcerer's apprentice: it no
longer knows how to switch off the overflowing powers of the welfare
and intervention state which it called into being for its own support and
legitimation. In order to understand better how the capitalist state was
manoeuvred into this situation, three phases of postwar development
ought to be distinguished.
First, during the 1950s an intensive reconstruction of the world
economy took place under extremely favourable conditions of capital
accumulation and concentration. Wages remained low as long as there
was an immense reservoir of wage labour including millions of refugees
and later migrant workers. The threat of the cold war dampened
industrial conflicts. An abundant supply of cheap raw materials and
energy boosted profitability as well as the new arrangements of free
trade under US dominance. Industrial production became primarily
geared to export markets.
Second, by the 1960s the booming postwar economies had absorbed
most surplus labour and near full employment was reached. Real wages
began to rise rapidly, labour organizations gained status and power, and
industrial relations became the main focus of the Keynesian welfare
state. Its task was to tie "mass consumption levels to rising productivity
levels through a pattern of collective bargaining."10 The state became
9 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 176.
10 David Wolfe, "The Crisis in Advanced Capitalism: An Introduction," Studies in
Political Economy 11 (1983), 11.
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responsible for wage and welfare increases and rising productivity at the
same time. It was during this period of the 1960s and 1970s that "the
social transformation of advanced capitalist states accelerated": state
interventionism became dominant, total public expenditure exceeded 50
per cent of Gross National Product, and welfare spending 50 per cent of
total public expenditure in several Western countries.11
Third, in the 1980s we have seen the emergence of yet another
phase. In order to cope with economic crisis and budget deficits,
conservative governments in Britain, West Germany and the United
States have embarked upon a precarious and contradictory path of
thinning out previously undisputed social safety nets and targeting a
selective reconstruction of their ailing economies. They follow the
neo-liberal advice that the overdrawn expectations of postmaterialist
welfare societies must be curbed in order to channel scarcer financial
resources towards more productive investment.
What if Western industrial societies have reached a level of
aggregate complexity which makes such readjustment well-nigh
impossible? It was the earlier phase of postwar economic expansion and
affluence which allowed the interventionist success of the Keynesian
welfare state. Mass production and productivity gains were tied to
parallel increases in wages and mass consumption. It seems doubtful
that a strategy of negative Keynesianism, that is, the adjustment of mass
production and mass consumption to a lower aggregate level, can be
administered "democratically." It seems likewise improbable that
entire industrial societies can be drastically restructured in order to meet
the profitability criteria of capital. According to our underlying
hypothesis it is the mutually reinforcing character of postmaterialist
persistence and deepening structural contradictions under conditions of
scarcity which accounts for the current crisis.
Postmaterialism and Scarcity
Three interrelated themes have dominated the conservative crisis
discussion in recent years: governmental overload, postmaterialist
value change, and the necessity of national economic reconstruction.
The crisis report to the Trilateral Commission summed up causes and
culprits: the ungovernability of overloaded governments stems from
excessive demands and overindulgence; wealth and education have
spawned an "adversary culture" among intellectuals and the media,
delegitimizing authority in capitalist democracies; excessive democracy
is replacing healthy democratic apathy; these intrinsic challenges to
governance prevent postmaterialist societies from adjusting to rapid
I 1 Goeran Therborn, "Classes and States," Studies in Political Economy 12 (1984),
32-36.
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economic change, and especially from meeting the external challenge of
competition and interdependency in the international marketplace.12
The most powerful and widely accepted explanation of the new
politics of ungovernability has come from Inglehart's theory of
postmaterialist change. Defining postmaterialism as the
intergenerational shift from acquisitive to participatory political
values,13 Inglehart has also diagnosed the consequences of such
behavioural change: the potentially self-defeating neglect of the
"economic base on which postmaterialism ultimately depends" by the
"anti-industrial outlook of some of the movement's ideologues."14
According to this view it is the anti-industrial attitude which prevents
postindustrial societies from taking on the challenge of international
economic competition, and it is here that governments must find their
new role: in administering reindustrialization, re-education, and the
reallocation of necessary economic losses.15 The bottom line is that the
efforts of economic restructuring are frustrated by the persistence of
postmaterialist values. While industrial states struggle with economic
crisis, their societies are still guided by the earlier experience of
affluence and welfarism. Based on the periodicity of intergenerational
change alone, such views neglect the impact of the economic crisis itself.
They need to be modified and extended in several ways.
(1) While postmaterialism gained momentum during the affluent
1960s, it was the crisis of the 1970s which made it so persistent when the
earlier promises of success, equity and participation remained
unfulfilled. As one study of the Green Party in West Germany has
shown, the postmaterialist partisan realignment appears as "an
immediate consequence of the economic recession." Green voters are
usually both "young and better educated." In the wake of "drastic
reductions in public spending" and sinking "employment
opportunities," the frustrations of this //i/ra-generational elite led to
partisan dealignment, and to the formation of alternative channels of
participation. In other words, postmaterialism in the 1980s indicates a
crisis-induced "conflict within rather than between generations."16
12 See Crozier et al., The Crisis of Democracy, 1-9 and 113-15.
13 "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial
Societies," American Political Science Review 65 (1971), 994-95.
14 "The Changing Structures of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in Russell J.
Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck (eds.), Electoral Change in Advanced
Industrial Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 69.
15 See AmitaiEtzioni, An Immodest Agenda (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983); Chalmers
Johnson (ed.), The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984); Clark
Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1983); Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), State and Market (London: Sage, 1985); Orlando Fals
Borda (ed.), The Challenge of Social Change (London: Sage, 1985); Alice M. Rivlin
(ed.), Economic Choices 1984 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984).
16 Wilhelm P. Buerklin, "Value Change and Partisan Realignment in West Germany
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(2) The effects of economic scarcity have been reinforced by a
social scarcity of generalized growth. As Fred Hirsch argued, economic
growth has mainly worked as a "superior substitute for redistribution."
It has brought "mass consumption to the point where it causes
congestion in the widest sense.'' The individual value and opportunity of
higher education declines, for example, when such education becomes
available at a mass level. At a higher aggregate level, distributional
conflict is intensified rather than relieved: "If everyone stands on tiptoe,
no one sees better." The economic crisis is also a crisis of growth.
Attitudinal change does not only stem from the experience of excessive
consumerism, it is heightened and hardened by the devaluation of
individual positional achievements in crowded industrial societies.17
(3) Insisting that the capitalist reconstruction project must be
shielded against the perils of "excessive democracy," the overload
theorists advocate a parallel programme of societal re-education geared
to the traditional values of family and group life.18 They forget that it was
the same entrepreneurial spirit they seek to rekindle which helped to
erode the traditional value system of private group life and political
apathy. Deploring the fragmentizing effects of excessive individualism,
they overlook that it is the business ethic which "tends to reduce social
relationships to a 'cash-nexus' destroying earlier ideas of an organic
society" without "putting anything in their place."19 When the explicit
allocation of economic losses is on the agenda, there is little hope that the
appeal to family-oriented complacency will be crowned with success.
Scarcity and the State
The notion of ungovernability as a crisis of overload implies that the
problem can be overcome by adequate restructuring and selective
retargeting: we must become leaner, harder and tougher. It is on this that
the planners and strategists of most Western liberal democracies have
come to place their hope. However, at least two aspects of this structural
crisis seem to be persistent: an economic crisis of surplus capacities and
a fiscal crisis of budget deficits.
The postwar modernization of the European and Japanese
economies under US hegemony, and the eventual know-how transfer to
the developing world, led to a novel degree of world productivity. The
1970-1983," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, 1984, 9-12.
17 Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 2-10; compare
Adrian Ellis and Krishan Kumar (eds.), Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies (London:
Tavistock, 1983).
18 Etzioni, An Immodest Agenda, 361; see also 3-25 and 342-71.
19 Robert Skidelsky, "The Decline of Keynesian Politics," in Colin Crouch (ed.), State
and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 64.
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United States, Europe, and Japan have become serious competitors in a
world market no longer dominated by one economic superpower. While
the debt-ridden countries of the Third World offer very limited
possibilities of additional market expansion, some of the newly
developing countries have become additional competitors in the already
overcrowded old markets. What had earlier begun in the United States
eventually became a central feature of all modernized economies: their
success was increasingly tied to the parallel growth of mass production
and mass consumption. The "globalization" of economic expansion20
was facilitated by the internationalization of capital and by free trade.
But eventually this system became a victim of its own success: surplus
capacities in declining sectors have led to neo-protectionism, and
markets are becoming increasingly saturated. The limits of growth are
also dictated by the surplus capacities of overloaded world markets.
What the conservative agenda overlooks most of all are these
international constraints of economic recovery. Domestic restructuring
will augment the problems and conflicts of international competition.
What will be gained at home may be lost in the world market. In other
words, if all the industrial states of the West stand on tiptoe, no one will
be further ahead. As the reality of neo-protectionism underneath the
rhetoric of free trade reveals, capitalist states are faced with the
globalization of those same structural contradictions internationally
which could only be contained domestically by steady economic growth
and the availability of unexhausted markets.
Parallel to administering the expanding dynamic of mass
production, the state had also become responsible for the maintenance
and stabilization of mass consumption. But when the postwar boom
ended, the limitations of Keynesian interventionism became apparent.
Contrary to the ideological assertions of the business community, it was
the growing disjunction of capitalist production and mass consumption,
and not government intervention, which caused economic stagnation
and inflation at the same time. Deficit spending was a response to the
persistent demands of consumers and producers.
On the one hand, the demands of organized labour (strengthened
under the earlier regime of near full employment) forced the state to
expand its social policy programmes, the costs of which skyrocketed
when massive unemployment became the consequence of recessionary
strategies designed to curb inflation. On the other hand, the state had to
embark upon a massive programme of economic restructuring. Business
confidence increasingly had to be pampered by subsidies and tax breaks.
It does not require much theoretical sophistication to see how this
emerging pattern of double spending (for accumulation and
20 See Alain Lipietz, "The Globalisation of the General Crisis of Fordism," SNID
Occasional Paper (Kingston: Queen's University, 1984), esp. 4-14.
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legitimation) would result in a fiscal crisis of the state. Instead of
supplying the public purse with tax funds for the state's welfare
activities, business itself has become a recipient of public spending. The
fiscal budget deficits resulting from such double spending may well be
regarded as the ultimate manifestation of the structural contradictions in
which the capitalist state finds itself enmeshed. In order to overcome the
political resistance to structural change, the effects of which are sectoral
decline and unemployment, the state not only has to finance transfer
payments to the new growth sectors, but also supply increasing levels of
welfare for the structurally displaced and unemployed. If, on the other
hand, the state wants to contain these costs of welfare, it ends up
financing not only growing sectors but also subsidizing declining ones.21
While a persistent fiscal crisis must obviously undermine the
efficiency of the capitalist intervention state, the creeping erosion and
delegitimization of the institutions of liberal democracy may be even
more dramatic consequences. The state can only administer a selective
programme of change if it can deal directly with its crucial participants.
In doing so, "there is every reason for [these] participants to keep their
delicate exchange of proposals, information and threats as remote as
possible [...] from the public eye." The parliamentary process is
reduced in its "ability to provide for the articulation of conflict."
Consequently, those who are left out by this new deal of economic
reconstruction may seek "alternative channels of conflict," and the
state may have to respond to this further erosion of democratic
legitimacy by "other sources" of political management than "the
democratic political process."22
There is widespread consensus as to the deplorable state of
economic policy-making at the present stage, but opinions are opposed
as to causes and cures. Overload theorists believe that the crisis can be
overcome by adequate restructuring, however painful it may be.
Looking at the strength and resilience of neo-conservative regimes, they
argue that the cause of overload and the persistence of economic
stagnation is not opposition to the prescribed change, but rather
indifference and lack of co-operation; consequently, the cure is to be
found in reasserting political authority, moral re-education and,
hopefully, a "spurt of economic growth."23 For neo-conservatives the
ongoing crisis is little more than a temporary side-effect on the road to
necessary modernization,24 and a good deal of the persistent success of
21

Compare John Zysman, "Inflation and the Politics of Supply," in Lindberg and
Mayer (eds.), The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, 147-48; and on the
causal nexus of inflation and deficit spending, see David R. Cameron, "Does
Government Cause Inflation? Taxes, Spending, and Deficits" (ibid., 224-79).
22 Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, 164-70.
23 Rose, "Ungovernability," 369.
24 Compare Robert B. Reich, "Toward a New Public Philosophy," The Atlantic

246

THOMAS O. HUEGLIN

neo-conservative regimes, therefore, stems from their media
incantations that the end of the tunnel is in sight.
The theorists concerned with the irreconcilable contradictions of
the capitalist economy, on the other hand, have little faith in the success
of the neo-conservative agenda: "Coming in the wake of liberal failure,
conservative policies are popular, but also impotent; tension-relieving,
but not ultimately satisfying; and nostalgic, if unable to face the
future."25 This scepticism stems from a radically different analysis of the
causes of crisis. Radical political economists see the present crisis as one
of capitalism itself. Maybe this crisis can be patched over once again by
incrementalist crisis management, but certainly there will be no cure in
the long run.
It seems clear that the capitalist state has become enmeshed in
contradictory activities which were not foreseen by the "logic of
Keynesianism," when governments were "to determine the level of
output, not what was produced, who produced it and to whom it
went."26 The problem of the neo-conservative agenda seems to be that it
attempts to prescribe a definite cure which is hardly based on a solid
analysis of the causes of the present crisis. The radical left, on the other
hand, appears to be much better equipped for providing such an
analysis, but fails to give precise directions as to where late capitalist
societies might move from here. Looking next at the patterns of
structural change which are already visible, however, some such
directions can be suggested.
3. Patterns of Structural Change

According to the orthodox view, ungovernability and economic crisis
stem from the deformations of the marketplace through the
interventionist welfare state. This "politicization of economic life" is at
the same time caused and perpetuated by the participatory demands of a
postmaterialist clientele cushioned against the hardships of competitive
work through the welfare achievements of this very same system of
politicized interventionism.27 In the light of these assumptions the
orthodox prescription for betterment is relatively obvious. It mainly
consists of a belt-tightening and re-educative "public philosophy," and
a corrected and revitalized market mechanism "for the promotion of
Monthly, May 1985, 68-79; Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1979); and Michael Walzer, "Nervous Liberals," New York Review of
Books, October 11, 1979, 5-9.
25 A. Wolfe, "Sociology, Liberalism, and the Radical Right," New Left Review 128
(1981), 22.
26 Skidelsky, "The Decline of Keynesian Politics," 57.
27 See Melvyn Krauss, " 'Europeanizing' the U.S. Economy: The Enduring Appeal of
the Corporatist State," in Johnson (ed.), The Industrial Policy Debate, 71-90.
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social ends." 28 The essence of the revitalization programme is, in the
words of Aaron Wildavsky, "intensification of economic growth now in
order to provide more for redistributive and environmental purposes
later."29 Some instrumental differences exist as to how the recovery
programme can be achieved: while neo-conservatives claim to rely
solely on a deregulated market system, neo-liberals want to allow for
some degree of "semi-targeted"30 state interventionism. There must be
serious doubts as to whether the prescribed cure in either variety can
work. The revitalization of the market as a self-regulating system of
reproduction alludes to a myth even under the most favourable
economic conditions, and in its semi-targeted form belies its own
pretension. The distinction of private and public has always been a
"crude fiction" and, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, the realization of a
purely private market system would amount to nothing less than a
"satanic mill."31
Under conditions of scarcity, however, the attempt to target market
reconstruction through the actions of an already overburdened state
simply "mocks" political reality.32 Low profitability and declining
growth have made the state vulnerable to the delegitimizing effects of
selectivity. Concentrating its efforts on "winners," the state not only
frustrates losing sectors and segments of society, it also undermines its
autonomy and control over those segments of organized capitalism on
which its political power depends. On the one hand, as the winner-loser
strategy cuts across classes (skilled workers versus unemployed, for
instance, or big business versus small business), the collective
bargaining scheme tends to break down because the organizational elites
may lose control over their rank and file.33 On the other hand, the big
private interests find their bargaining position formidably improved:
because the survival of the nation economy in the volatile international
marketplace depends on their co-operation, they can successfully
demand increased state support and put national economic planning
under the constraints of their preferences.34
28 Ashford, "The Neo-Conservatives," 362.
29 "Squaring the Political Circle: Industrial Policies and the American Dream," in
Johnson (ed.), The Industrial Policy Debate, 42.
30 See Etzioni, An Immodest Agenda, 315.
31 The Great Transformation, 73.
32 See Robert L. Heilbroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism (New York: Norton,
1985), 105-06.
33 Compare Wolfgang Streeck, "Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the
Economic Crisis in West Germany," in John H. Goldthorpe(ed.), Order and Conflict
in Contemporary Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), esp. 303-14.
34 Compare Allessandro Pizzorno, "Interests and Parties in Pluralism," in Suzanne
Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 267-68.
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While losing control over the economy in its entirety, national
policy-making falls victim to blackmail from powerful domestic and
multinational corporations, on the success of which governments have
become increasingly dependent. The state's capacity to use its fiscal and
administrative expertise in order to regulate necessary economic
change, independently from competing business factions and class
conflict, diminishes. Selectively targeted restructuring under fiscal
constraint and geared to the whims of the world market raises doubt as to
the widely accepted concept of the state's "relative autonomy."35 The
controversial strategy of selective restructuring not only ties the state to
the dominant interests of the economy, it also increases rather than
diminishes the problem of "overload." The restructuring process itself
proves costly, as the free market strategy "paradoxically" requires
"drastic intervention." Moreover, as capital spending is redirected
towards cost-cutting rationalization investment, persistent mass
unemployment may be "ultimately driving up expenditures on those
programs," the costs of which were to be reduced in the first place.36
It is in this context that it becomes necessary to re-examine one of
the overload theorists' basic premises: that an increase in participatory
demands equals a shift from acquisitive towards postmaterialist values.
The belief in unlimited growth during the affluent 1960s had created
postmaterialist expectations which turned out to be "overdrawn" when
the first signs of constraint and crisis showed in the 1970s. After the deep
recession of the early 1980s, however, with the prospects of lasting
unemployment and rising social insecurity, political mobilization may
well have become a prerequisite for material survival. This does not
necessarily mean that a lasting destabilization of late capitalist societies
is imminent. But the sociopolitical containment of potential mobilization
has become part of the neo-conservative agenda of crisis management.
Contained Mobilization
After a period of continued growth and political stability in the 1950s and
1960s, the "massive politicization and mobilization"37 of the late 1960s
and 1970s came as a shock to those who had become accustomed to the
"politics of consensus in an age of affluence." The rise of new regional
and social movements38 seemed to confirm the postmaterialist
35

Compare Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State," in L. Panitch
(ed.), The Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 7-8; and the
debate between Leslie A. Pal and Carl J. Cuneo in this JOURNAL 19 (1986), 71-103.
36 Teresa Amott, "The Politics of Reaganomics," in Edward Nell (ed.), Free Market
Conservatism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 173-74.
37 Suzanne Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe in the Seventies,"
Daedalus 108 (1979), 27.
38 See Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (eds.), New Nationalisms of the
Developed West (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985); Fals Borda, The Challenge of
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hypothesis of persistent attitudinal change resulting from the years of
affluence. However, the emphasis on attitude overlooked the mobilizing
effects of structural change. As Huntington had pointed out, the
unreformed institutions of the traditional nation-state would fail to
accommodate the new intra-class cleavages in highly complex
postmaterialist societies.39 This line of argument can now be expanded.
(1) With the end of growth and the necessity of reslicing the pie, one
important factor of mobilization was the growing consciousness of the
inherent inequality of state intervention. The selectivity of the
asymmetrical restructuring programme accelerated the formation of
fragmented interests.
On the side of organized labour, the new dividing line lies between
those who can hope for job stabilization through collective action and
those for whom unemployment has rendered such action meaningless.
When structural unemployment must be considered as a persistent
factor of economic life, a wedge is driven into the collective spirit of
labour. Trade union solidarity must decline with its capacity to speak for
and defend the working force in its entirety. Once again attitudinal
change appears as a consequence of declining employment chances.
On the side of organized capital the picture is equally dismal. As the
restructuring and modernization project increasingly becomes
dependent on the alliance of state bureaucracy, big business and
scientific technocracy, the declining segments of business become
increasingly frustrated. And the domestic links between core and
spin-off industries become brittle when multinationals increasingly shift
their operations to the cheaper labour markets abroad. The coherent
support of national industrial strategies no longer seems plausible. The
globalization of capitalist production favours the formation of a
corporatist bloc of dominant economic interests, and it leads to the
dualization of national economies.
Caught in the contradictory and fragmented expectations of capital
and labour, the state appears paralyzed over such issues as
protectionism, subsidization and/or free trade. The recent appeals of
conservative governments to small business initiative highlight this
fragmentation. Since small businesses can hardly substitute for the
evasive multinationals as a new vanguard of national economic
consolidation, their status appears to be reduced to that of—albeit
demanding—recipients of a new kind of economic welfare.
(2) What further exacerbates fragmented interest formation is the
increased visibility of selective state intervention. Big government,
whether in its interventionist or, "paradoxically," in its free market
Social Change; and Jo Freeman (ed.), Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies
(New York: Longman, 1983).
39 See above, note 2.
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variety, increases the number of dependency-relationships for which it
is held responsible. When it is met at the same time with a declining
capacity to fulfill its obligations due to growth failure and fiscal
constraints, big government becomes exposed and vulnerable to the
electoral blackmail of a fragmented clientele with contradictory
expectations. For once, the orthodox picture of overloaded
governments caught in a world "at once more demanding and more
intractable"40 seems to tally with the radical view of a "disjunction"
between the "declining capacity of political institutions" and the
"growing politicization of everyday life."41 But the congruence is
misleading: while overload pessimists concede that it will be difficult to
reduce overload due to hardened expectations and electoral constraints,
radical pessimists suggest that this demand overload is perpetuated by
the very efforts to overcome the intractability of late capitalism.
In either case speculations as to the final destabilization of late
capitalist systems seem premature. What is surprising now, after the
deep recession of the early 1980s, is not the fragility of the capitalist
state, but its apparent resilience. For the time being, neo-conservative
governments which openly proclaim and enact drastic change are
enjoying electoral support. Is social and political destabilization an
intellectual chimera of political theorists bored with the political apathy
of postindustrial societies and the blandness of their political leaders?
Rather, it is the blandness of current political rhetoric, and the media
incantations of imminent economic recovery, which are meant to divert
public attention from the growing cracks in the social fabric of
postindustrial societies. The tactic is one of conflict internalization and
externalization.
What went on behind the "teflon shield" of the Reagan presidency
was the internationalization of growing cleavages "through complex
lobbying, deals and tradeoffs."42 Using the external factor of a tough
foreign policy stance as a certificate of strong leadership, the Reagan
administration aimed at a winning coalition of neo-conservative
ideological retrenchment and neo-liberal economic success. In Britain
the "iron grip" of Margaret Thatcher has weathered the responsibility
for an unprecedented postwar recession by rallying a traditionally
collective spirit against the internal and external enemy. Crushing the
unions and winning the Falklands war, she could proclaim that "Britain
is great again." Behind the "smokescreen" of the monetarist "miracle
that never happened" looms a political agenda of restructuring: a "free
economy and strong state." 43
40
41
42
43

King, "Overload," 294.
Berger, "Politics and Antipolitics in Western Europe," 30.
Amott, "The Politics of Reaganomics," 173.
Geoff Hodgson, "Thatcherism: The Miracle That Never Happened," in Nell (ed.),
Free Market Conservatism, 184-91.

Politics of Fragmentation in an Age of Scarcity

251

Despite considerable differences in style and goals—short-term
economic success through multiple tradeoffs in the one case, and the
fundamentalist reorganization of politics and economy through the
resolute promotion of an ideological counter-revolution in the
other44—there is a common denominator of strategy: to contain the
increasing rifts of socioeconomic and structural fragmentation. What
has stabilized neo-conservative policy-making is not so much a
sustained level of mass support as the cross-cutting quality of policy
outcomes which prevents effective counter-strategies through the
traditional channels of opposition.
The case of Britain is instructive: while mass unemployment divides
the party/union movement on the left, the traditional cleavage between
financial capital and industrial manufacturing is deepened through
monetarism.45 As Colin Leys has demonstrated, it is this incongruence
between class structure and socioeconomic opposition which has
stabilized Thatcherism thus far: while being devastated and decimated,
the manufacturing community cannot bring itself to vote other than
Conservative.46 In Reagan's America, on the other hand, the looming
outbreak of the sunbelt-frostbelt conflict is mainly contained by the lack
of any credible (party) alternative. In Congress the impact of economic
restructuring is a cross-cutting issue which prevents effective
opposition. Outside, the "rainbow coalition" of losers is still in the
process of learning the lesson of collective solidarity. Shrewdly
manipulating these cross-cutting cleavages, the president remains
insulated from direct responsibility.
The present electoral success of neo-conservative regimes does not
contradict the earlier diagnosis of a potential mobilization of fragmented
interests in late capitalist societies. This success has been based on the
generalized promise of change in times of crisis and scarcity. Change has
been administered, but it has increased the contradictions of
accumulation and legitimation. For the time being, the threat of
socioeconomic destabilization seems under control because the
grievances of the new groups of losers cut across the traditional lines of
(class) conflict, and can be contained through strategies of political
subterfuge, coalition-building and log-rolling. But a growing
44 See Steven E. Schier and Norman J. Vig,'' Economic Performance and Mass Support:
The Thatcher and Reagan Regimes," in N. J. Vig and S. E. Schier (eds.), Political
Economy in Western Democracies (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 257-83.
45 See Peter A. Hall, "Patterns of Economic Policy: An Organizational Approach," in
Stephen Bornstein, David Held and Joel Krieger (eds.), The State in Capitalist
Europe (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 21-43; and Bob Jessop, "The
Transformation of the State in Post-War Britain," in Richard Scase (ed.), The State in
Western Europe (London: Croom Helm, 1980), 30-33.
46 "Thatcherism and British Manufacturing: A Question of Hegemony," New Left
Review 151 (1985), 5-25.
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polarization of late capitalist societies can no longer be denied. Because
of the structural effects of unemployment and declining life chances, this
polarization is linked to individual social status and sectoral occupation
rather than class, and according to the spatial division of labour in
advanced industrial systems, it tends to be tied to economic regions.
When socioeconomic and regional polarization become mutually
reinforcing, its "conflict-generating potential" may indeed outweigh the
"conflict-resolving capacity"47 of conservative crisis management.
Polarization
The efforts of curtailing welfare expansion to the requirements of
"restored business confidence," and of restructuring national
economies to the imperatives of an internationally competitive
"investment climate" began before neo-conservative governments
swept to power. Thatcher continued a path of wage restraint, deflation
and unemployment already visible under her Labour predecessor
Callaghan, and Reagan's policy of tight money control along with
supply-side economics had already been initiated by Carter.48
While the overall analysis of policy-making in crisis-ridden
capitalist economies may indicate that "the political composition of
governments does not make a difference,"49 a point can be made that
neo-conservative regimes do make a difference, at least in specific
policy fields and problem areas. Their present efforts of economic
restructuring aim at, find more acceptable than before, or at least treat as
dependent variables, such polarizing structural change as (1) a
substantial degree of social restratification, (2) a deliberate dynamic of
sectoral deindustrialization, and (3) a reinforcing pattern of spatial
disintegration. The record shows both the main strength and liability of
the neo-conservative restructuring project. On the one hand, there is
decisive action. Reaganomics and Thatcherism contrast sharply with the
previous policy style of incrementalist crisis management which rapidly
lost its appeal to payers and recipients of the welfare state. On the other
hand it becomes clear that "any decisive solution of the economic
problem will have to be a sociopolitical, rather than simply a technical
one, and one out of which clear winners and losers will emerge."50
(1) Social restratification is incurred through the acceptance of
increasing income inequality and of lasting mass unemployment. In the
47 Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, 164.
48 See Reich, "Toward a New Public Philosophy," 72-73; and Leys, "Thatcherism and
British Manufacturing," 88-89.
49 Manfred G. Schmidt, "The Welfare State and the Economy in Periods of Economic
Crisis: A Comparative Study of Twenty-Three OECD Nations," in Vig and Schier
(eds.), Political Economy in Western Democracies, 148-49.
50 John Goldthorpe, "Problems of Political Economy After the End of the Post-War
Period," unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1982, 40.
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United States, budget cutting under the Reagan administration has
significantly contributed to a new record level of poverty. Due to
administration policies, the growing income inequality has particularly
affected such problem groups as black and female-headed families;
while the top 40 per cent of income earners gained substantially in real
disposable income (8.7% for the top 20% between 1980 and 1984), the
bottom 40 per cent lost considerably (-7.6% for the poorest quintile).
Thatcher's policies in Britain have also resulted in a major upward
redistribution of income. Again, while the wealthiest 20 per cent of
households gained in real disposable income, the poorest quintile
suffered a loss of 9.7 per cent (between 1978-1979 and 1981-1982). The
case of West Germany underlines the impact of lasting unemployment
itself on socioeconomic polarization. While unemployment soared from
3.7 to 9.4 per cent (1980-1984), federal contributions to unemployment
assistance and eligibility standards have been continuously curtailed at
the same time. As a consequence, the number of unemployment benefit
recipients has decreased by 13.3 per cent during the same period. While
the average duration of unemployment increased from 3.7 to 11.6 months
(with 53% unemployment of more than 2 years), the level of overall
payments has been lowered, and federal contributions per unemployed
have been more than cut in half.51
(2) Sectoral deindustrialization has become a major concern in
industrial policy debates. While the newly established market orthodoxy
believes in the creative destruction of entire segments of the their
economies, Keynesians and radicals alike see irreparable damage
resulting from the reduction of structural diversity. The profit and
investment squeeze on manufacturing in particular appears as a
consequence of both recession and high interest rates. But then these
were in part calculated monetarist strategies in order to bring down
inflation. While creditors and "high-tech" sectors gained,
manufacturing bore the brunt of such destructive creativity. Due to the
mismatch between the skill requirements of the manufacturing and
"high-tech" segments of the work force, structural and lasting
unemployment is exacerbated further. While some of this
unemployment can be absorbed in the service sector as a last resort for
job creation, the result is a deskilling of labour and downgrading of wages
and living standards, in part due to the ongoing politics of service
deregulation. The politics of tight money finally leads to an accelerated
51 See for details: John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill (eds.), The Reagan Record
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1984), 321-37; Steven E. Schierand Norman J. Vig, "Reviving
Capitalism: Macroeconomic Policies in Britain and the United States," in Vig and
Schier (eds.), Political Economy in Western Democracies, 182-94; Leys,
"Thatcherism and British Manufacturing," 10-11; Heiner Bremer et al., Politik der
Wende (Hamburg: Rasch und Roehring, 1985), 83-84; compare also, Paul Blumberg,
Inequality in an Age of Decline (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
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dynamic of financial Darwinism. Unwilling to pay the high interest on
investment credits and aided by antitrust deregulation, industrial capital
has increasingly been used to buy up other firms rather than to finance
expanding production. Further job losses are the consequence.
While it is premature to cast a concluding judgment on the
performance and the impact of neo-conservative regimes on sectoral
polarization, the record nevertheless seems indicative of the above
generalizations. In the United States the rate of unemployment due to
closings of manufacturing plants doubled between 1978-1980 and
1980-1982. Business bankruptcies reached record levels and continued
undiminished during the upswing in 1983, even when they stalled in
Britain. Merger and acquisition activities soared. Some corporations
report higher earnings from financial activities than from industrial
production. The picture in Britain is similar: mergers on the one hand
and bankruptcies on the other. One difference is that crucial industries
are sold off to American multinationals. Britain is rapidly becoming a
branch-plant economy. The costs are mainly borne by manufacturing.
Bankruptcies and liquidations more than doubled between 1978 and
1982. Manufacturing output fell by 14 per cent by 1983. While official
unemployment in Britain has risen beyond 13 per cent, it reached 20 per
cent in overall manufacturing and over 33 per cent in metal
manufacturing and engineering. Typically, the only sector which has
increased its work force (by less than 2%) is insurance, banking and
finance. Declared as a year of recovery, 1984 also saw the highest rate of
bankruptcies in the history of West Germany. While the profits of giant
industries recovered formidably, banks reported a dangerous trend of
decapitalization among middle-sized and small businesses. The Federal
Cartel Agency reported an increased process of economic
concentration.52
(3) Spatial disintegration is the inevitable side-effect of
socioeconomic polarization and concentration due to the regional
division of labour in advanced industrial systems. As capitalism spreads
unevenly, centre-periphery relationships develop with peripheral
development dependent on central control. In times of rapid expansion
this dependency is usually characterized as one of manufacturing over
52 Palmer and Sawhill, The Reagan Record, 287-316; The Economist, February 25,
1984,99; Candee S. Harris, "The Magnitude of Job Loss From Plant Closings and the
Generation of Replacement Jobs: Some Recent Evidence," in "Deindustrialization:
Restructuring the Economy," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 475 (1984), 25-26; Rivlin, Economic Choices 1984,119-33; Amott, "The
Politics of Reaganomics," 177-79; Barry Bluestone and Bennet Harrison, The
Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 188-90; Leys,
"Thatcherism and British Manufacturing," 12-13; David Rose et al., "Economic
Restructuring: The British Experience," in "Deindustrialization: Restructuring the
Economy," 144-45; Bremer et al., Politik der Wende, 30-31.
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primary production. Under conditions of scarcity, however, it is the
control over finances, information flow and decision-making which
characterizes centre-periphery dependency. This dependency becomes
more visible when central responsibility and control is met with a
declining capacity to fulfill expectations due to economic and fiscal
constraints. When central decision-making becomes more selective,
spatial polarization results from the conflict between contracting centres
and resisting peripheries. This polarization is reinforced by the process
of selective structural modernization.
The ongoing process of central contraction is most visible in Britain.
In the traditional manufacturing region of the West Midlands,
unemployment was 5 per cent higher than the national average by 1983.
The centrally controlled oil industry has helped to destroy much of the
manufacturing industry by boosting the nondollar exchange rate by 41
per cent between 1979 and 1981. Central co-operation between state and
multinational corporations aims at a national economic recovery
ignorant and negligent of domestic manufacturing interests. In the words
of Tom Nairn, the "metropolitan heartland complex" is being
restructured into a "service-zone to international capital," while the
industries of the peripheries "will eventually be shut down or sold off."
Economic restructuring is complemented by a reversal of regional
development policy. Drastic cuts in regional aid have become part of the
economic recovery project. Regional polarization has also been noted in
the United States. Different rates of economic growth/decline and the
asymmetrical impact of the energy crisis on consumer/producer states
have triggered a new salience of regional egotism and protectionism.
Socioeconomically induced migration has particularly intensified
interregional grievances. After having absorbed millions of unskilled
rural workers from the south, the north is now in a process of losing its
skilled workers—and its tax base—to the modernizing sunbelt.
Reagan's "new" new federalism likewise contributes to these regional
strains as the new concept of decentralization spells central spending
concentration and peripheral austerity. The distress and inequity
resulting from the regional mismatch between job loss and job creation
have become accepted parts of the recovery programme. Melvyn Krauss,
an economist with the Wall Street Journal, rejects regional policy as a
nationally inefficient mode of bringing "work to the workers rather than
havfing] workers go to the work." From the periphery, however, comes
a different view. In the words of Dennis Kucinich, former mayor of
Cleveland, Ohio, "There are increasingly two Americas,... the
America of multinationals dictating decisions in Washington, and the
America of neighbourhoods and rural areas, who feel left out."
The spatial effects of neo-conservative modernization are also
being felt in West Germany—despite the country's relative structural
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homogeneity. The government-concerted strategy of recapturing the
international competitiveness of the steel industry through drastic
capacity reduction and concentration has resulted in disproportionately
high regional and local unemployment. Tied into a recessionary cartel of
corporatist restructuring, the unions had to share in a policy of massive
regional job losses in order to save the stability of a contracting labour
market in the steel sector as a whole. Hit by unemployment of up to 20
per cent, Germany's coastal region is suffering from particularly
unpleasant effects of deindustrialization. While parts of its highly
modern shipyards are dismantled and sold off to China, jobs are being
offered for under-minimum wages by neighbouring wood-processing
plants neither incorporated in the country's association of employers,
nor bound by its tariff agreements.53
The neo-conservative record is ambiguous and clear-cut at the same
time. It is ambiguous because monetarism engineers economic
slow-down for the sake of reducing inflation, while supply-side tax-cuts
(and military spending) seek to stimulate growth at the same time. It is
unambiguously clear, however, that full employment as a policy priority
has been abandoned. As the Commission of the European Community
has pointed out, the goal is to achieve a relative change in the costs of
labour and capital "via accepted levels of unemployment."54 Reagan's
former chief economic adviser Murray L. Weidenbaum and American
business expert Michael J. Athey go one step further by trying to
uncouple the problem of unemployment from the agenda of economic
restructuring altogether. In their view the health of the nation's industry
has nothing to do with its unemployment rate: on the contrary, as
productivity rises, employment necessarily has to decline.55
The most pernicious aspect of this kind of economic reasoning is not
its business-as-usual attitude, which downplays the social consequences
of renewed market anarchy for the sake of factor mobility, but its
53 Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, Economy Territory Identity (London: Sage,
1983), 2-14; Rose et al., "Economic Restructuring," 145; Leys, "Thatcherism and
British Manufacturing," 24-25; Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and
Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977), 380; The Globe and Mail, Report on Britain,
May 6, 1985; Etzioni, An Immodest Agenda, 163-73; Deil S. Wright and Harvey L.
White (eds.), Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations (Washington: The
American Society for Public Administration, 1984), 25; Harris, "The Magnitude of
Job Loss From Plant Closings," 23-25; Krauss, " 'Europeanizing' the U.S.
Economy," 82; Kucinich, quoted in Peter N. Carroll, It Seems Like Nothing
Happened (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), 348; Josef Esser, Wolfgang
Fach and Werner Vaeth, Krisenregulierung (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1983),
54-187; Bremer et al., Politik der Wende, 41.
54 Quoted in Elmar Altvater, Kurt Huebner and Michael Stanger, Alternative
Wirtschaftspolitik jenseits des Keynesianismus (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1983), 160 (my translation).
55 "What is the Rust Belt's Problem?" in Johnson (ed.), The Industrial Policy Debate,
121-23.
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analytical blindness to the structural contradictions of market
capitalism. On the one hand, the rhetoric of deregulation in reality has
re-regulation in mind: the regulation of supply-side economics instead of
aggregate demand. On the other hand, the supply-side approach is of
little more than declaratory value. There is no guarantee that business
uses the given incentives for employment-intensive investment—or for
investment at all. The neo-conservative agenda can only suggest what
ought to be done: "From here on, we require faith."56
As they move from affluence to scarcity, and the polarizing patterns
of structural change become visible, postindustrial societies and their
governments have to contend with the contradictions of centralism and
regionalism, mass society and fragmentation, continued class struggle
and occupational/sectoral/regional conflict across classes, party
retrenchment and new social movements, contraction and expansion
of fragmented capitalist economies and the welfare state as their most
important support system. Under such conditions a politics of
fragmentation is likely to emerge which aims at the bifurcation of
postindustrial societies. Signs are already visible: on the one hand a
contracting core of productive efficiency which can expect to continue
to survive with the benefits of the state's helping hand; and on the other
hand an expanding periphery uncoupled from direct participation in the
capitalist mode of production and confined to existing largely without
such benefits.
4. The Politics of Fragmentation
The success of industrial capitalism has been based on spatial
expansion, and on the exploitation of labour and resources. Dependent
on growing centralization and monopolization, the "chain reaction" of
increasing capital accumulation required the continued ' 'enforcement of
inequality." In other words, it became necessary to insulate capitalism
from democratization.57 Increasingly the state had to perform the double
task of ensuring economic growth (accumulation) and social stability
(legitimation). But the visible interventionism of the state and the
mobilizing dynamic of the industrialization process itself could not
prevent a growing demand for political participation. This participatory
demand was muted during the postwar years of exceptional growth and
prosperity. It became reactivated (rather than newly created) through
the attitudinal and structural defects of modernization. When it became
threatened by economic crisis and scarcity, the chain reaction of
accumulation had to be secured by new/old modes of insulation.
56 Robert Lekachman, Greed is Not Enough: Reaganomics (New York: Pantheon,
1983), 13.
57 See Andrew Martin, "Political Constraints on Economic Strategies in Advanced
Industrial Societies," Comparative Politics 10 (1977), 323-54.
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The modernization project appears to be threatened from two sides:
increasing subsistence demands from the less productive segments of
the economy, and the persistent wage demands of organized labour.
Consequently, there are two apparent patterns of insulation: a strategy
of economic dualism via market deregulation and deflation, and/or a
strategy of neo-corporatism aiming at the state-mediated regulation of
industrial relations.
Deflationary and deregulatory strategies aim at the insulation of
winners from losers. The paralyzing effects of such a cross-cutting
dualization of labour and business are reinforced by an aggressive
ideology of competitiveness. Where organized labour is weak and the
cohesion of business low, as in Britain and the United States, the
strategy of economic bifurcation is met with little resistance. Where
labour is organized and strong, on the other hand, as in West Germany
for example, a different strategy of adjustment is required. Alternately
labelled as "organized capitalism" or "corporatism," it relies on
hierarchically controlled modes of political bargaining instead of market
deregulation, and on an ideology of social partnership instead of
competitiveness.58
The result of both strategies is the same, however: the growing
bifurcation of late capitalist societies into a dominant segment
sanctioned politically with a quasi-public status, and a residual segment
increasingly uncoupled from the capitalist exchange relationship. Again,
liberal and radical views differ substantively as to the structural impact
and social character of these recent trends of interest intermediation and
economic stabilization.
Economic Dualism
The idea of economic dualism is unacceptable to the orthodox economic
mind. There is only one labour market in which everybody competes
against everybody else, and everybody is rewarded by a wage according
to personal skills or "human capital." In other words, poverty,
unemployment and segmented industrial labour markets do not stem
from economic barriers to labour mobility such as the sectoral division
between high-pay monopoly industries and the low-pay industries in the
competitive sector. Unemployment and poverty are rather seen as a
consequence of the politically induced "downward rigidity" of wages.
Government subsidization of wages in "low-productivity uses"
prevents labour from being forced to move into "areas of higher
58 For a recent definition and analysis see Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World
Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 31-33. Incidentally, Katzenstein
relies almost entirely on the orthodox view of "liberal" corporatism; it seems to be a
pattern that "liberal" corporatists usually ignore their radical critics: see below, notes
62-67.
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productivity." From the economic restructuring point of view,
government tinkering with the labour market is unwanted and
inefficient: "The winners do not need such help." 59
The symptoms of economic dualization are particularly evident in
strongly regionalized economic systems such as Canada, where
orthodox economists have consistently renounced peripheral job
market stabilization as inefficient' 'transfer dependency.'' Firmly based
on the theoretical axiom of single market homogeneity, they plead for
peripheral—and national—economic recovery via the lowering of
minimum wages and forced migration.60 At least implicitly, this strategy
aims at the permanent establishment of a dual labour market: with
desirable high-pay sectors at the core and undesirable low-pay sectors at
the periphery. The economic viability and efficiency of such a strategy
appear doubtful. Migration is most likely to occur when unemployment
is high in core areas as well. Those at the lowest end of income and skills
will prove to be least mobile. And finally, public cost might be increased
rather than lowered when permanent unemployment at the core must be
subsidized rather than seasonal unemployment in the periphery.
From the radical point of view economic dualism is part of the
industrial modernization project itself. As evidence of expanding
employment in some sectors of light manufacturing and the service
industries indicates, low wages are not inevitably linked to
unemployment in declining sectors. Low-wage sectors rather seem to
survive due to the excess of workers dismissed from the contracting core
industries. The cleavage lines of the dual economy do not simply run
between growing and declining sectors, but between workers in weak
and strong sectors, weak and strong firms, large and small businesses,
competing production units, or simply between "ins" and "outs."
Contrary to the liberal assumptions of market homogeneity, the
record shows quite clearly that persistent tendencies of market dualism
contributed to the exceptional growth of the postwar period, and that
they have become even more entrenched under the conditions of recent
economic decline and crisis. The main features of utilizing dual labour
markets for purposes of growth and productivity are: (1) migrant
workers who can be instrumentalized as a "reserve labour army" during
59 See Paul Attewell, Radical Political Economy Since the Sixties (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1984), chap. 2; Lester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum Society
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), 54-61; and Kraus, "'Europeanizing' the U.S.
Economy," 82-90.
60 See the critical discussion in Ralph Matthews, The Creation of Regional Dependency
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 56-68; compare Thomas J. Courchene,
"Analytical Perspectives on the Canadian Economic Union," in Michael J.
Trebilcock et al. (eds.), Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union (Toronto:
Ontario Economic Counil, 1983), esp. 91-93; and recently by the same author, "The
Fiscal Arrangements: Focus on 1987," in Ottawa and the Provinces: The Distribution
of Money and Power (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985), vol. 1, 3-21.

260

THOMAS O. HUEGLIN

boom years and sent home during periods of decline (both
transnational^, as in Europe, and internally, as between Atlantic and
central Canada); (2) subcontracted small businesses which offer
nonunionized employment, flexible wages and exemptions from health
and safety regulations as a structural insurance of the core economy
against fluctuations in demand, and (3) marginal and temporary workers
who are to a large extent deprived of the legal protections of permanent
employment. They may work at home, seek work through
"labour-only" subcontracting businesses, or operate on the black
market.61
It is the ideology of competitiveness which ultimately stabilizes the
politics of economic dualism in fragmented capitalist societies. The
aggregate level of complexity in such societies makes it extremely
difficult for the various segments of capital to assess in advance the
consequences of such renewed market strategies as free trade and
deregulation. While everybody hopes to be on the winning side, the only
real winners are those economic sectors which in fact remain insulated
from the whims of the market because they possess monopoly and/or
multinational status. When this status is challenged by organized labour,
as in the case of West Germany, regulation must be achieved through a
contractive mechanism of corporatist intermediation.
Neo-corporatism
Commonly understood as a new form of economic crisis management,
corporatism describes state-mediated forms of political bargaining
between organized capital and labour. Liberal analysis understands it as
a new "logic of exchange" which can only be successful if symmetrical
rewards are granted to both partners at the negotiating table. The
success of corporatist strategies is held to depend on multiple consensus
requirements. The "amicable" social partnership between capital and
labour must be paralleled by consensual co-operation among the
political parties (government and opposition), and supported by the rank
and file within the ideological "camps" (parties and organized
interests). While the state-licensed participants in corporatist bargaining
schemes gain a quasi-public status, the process of interest
intermediation itself remains largely informal.62
61 Attewell, Radical Political Economy Since the Sixties, chaps. 2-3; Streeck,
"Neo-Corporatist Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis in West Germany,"
310-14; John H. Goldthorpe, "The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist
Tendencies in Modern Western Societies," in Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in
Contemporary Capitalism, 329-35.
62 See esp. Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Concluding Remarks: Problems for Future Research
on Corporatist Intermediation and Policy-Making," in Philippe C. Schmitter and
G. Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1979), 305; and G. Lehmbruch, "Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist
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This idyllic picture of integrating labour organizations into the
economic decision-making process of organized capitalism seems to fall
short of a realistic assessment in at least two aspects. First, it is painted
against the background of a flawed perception of pluralism (from which
corporatism wants to be distinguished conceptually). Defining pluralism
as a regime of group competition largely unrestrained from state
intervention and control, orthodox neo-corporatists neglect the
dominant role of business over all other groups. They start from
conceptual assumptions which the liberal school itself has long left
behind.63 Second, the picture of interest intermediation through
quasi-formal labour incorporation further neglects the informal aspects
of state intervention (rather than mediation) in labour-market
organization which principally restrict the manoeuverability of trade
unions.
Radical analysts emphasize that neo-corporatism is nothing but the
continuation of capitalist class domination with other means: an
alternative strategy of labour subordination when the "classic pattern of
control through markets" fails.64 Since this pattern of control hardly
qualifies the market exchange relationship in capitalist societies as
"pluralist" in the classical sense, neo-corporatism must at least be seen
as a continuation of pluralism with other means: a state-mediated
strategy of reducing "excessive democracy" and "governmental
overload" by limiting the number of legitimate participants in economic
policy-making. The dilemma of the liberal corporatist school can
therefore be summarized as a contradiction between the conceptual
"logic of exchange" and the evident "logistics of business domination."
Orthodox neo-corporatists try to circumvent this dilemma by pointing
Networks," in Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism,
60-80; for the classical definitions and discussion, see the articles by Philippe C.
Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch, in Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward
Corporatist Intermediation, and in Lehmbruch and Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of
Corporatist Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1982).
63 See Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982); Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
For a critical discussion of these authors, see John F. Manley, "Neo-Pluralism: A
Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II," American Political Science Review
77 (1983), 368-83; a useful critique of the conceptual flaws of neo-corporatism is
Stephen McBride, "Corporatism, Public Policy and the Labour Movement: A
Comparative Study," Political Studies 33 (1985), 439-56.
64 Colin Crouch, "The State, Capital and Liberal Democracy," in Crouch (ed.), State
and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism, 19; see also Wolfgang Fach,
"Ausgangspunkte des Diskurses, Ende des Modells?" Journalfuer Sozialforschung
23 (1983), 385-88; Hans Kastendiek, Hella Kastendiek and Hugo Reister,
"Incorporation of the Trade Unions?" (Frankfurt/Main: Institut fuer
Sozialforschung, 1983); Leo Panitch, "Corporatism and Capitalist Democracy,"
paper presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science
Association, Rio de Janeiro, 1982.
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out that corporatist strategies may only succeed // some form of
symmetrical exchange is achieved, and by at least tacitly acknowledging
that this may not always be the case.
Radical analysts, on the other hand, emphasize that such symmetry
is certainly not the intention of corporatist strategy. On the contrary, the
goal of corporatist intermediation is viewed as negatively as that of the
regime of market exchange: as the insulation of the capitalist
accumulation process from "excessive" participatory demands. The
neo-corporatist strategy thus aims at bifurcation by concertation.
Rather than attempting to achieve multiple consensus, corporatism
seeks to eliminate those segments of society from participation which
are no longer seen as essential for the accumulation process.
Horizontally, it seeks to insulate the economic core from peripheral
demands. The choices of liberal democracy are subordinated to an
industrial modernization project controlled by a cartelized elite of major
economic interests which have gained quasi-public status. Vertically, it
shields the bargaining elite from rank-and-file expectations. The
constraints of the required consensus force the unions to abandon
interest representation for the unskilled and unemployable, and they
allow the dominant economic interests to neglect the concerns of small
and declining businesses. "Liberal" corporatism appears as the
contracting strategy of a highly selective "corporatist bloc." 65
The main analytical strength of the neo-corporatist school has been
its emphasis on the continued existence of structural patterns in
advanced capitalist systems which tie organized labour into the state and
business-dominated network of economic policy-making. The
suggestion of a liberal "logic of exchange" remains misleading,
however, because it implies that the asymmetrical disadvantage of
labour in capitalist systems is somehow overcome. It is moreover
contradictory, because a strategy of licensed overload reduction
scarcely conforms to the pluralist ideology of liberalism—neither in its
naive variety, assuming unrestrained interchange among a plurality of
group organizations, nor in the refined version which suggests such
interchange among alternating elites.
But the main fallacy of orthodox neo-corporatism lies elsewhere: in
the assumption that corporatist arrangements can only be successful
when class polarization is neutralized by mutual amicability and
consensus. Such an assumption misconceives the asymmetrical nature
of the exchange relationship between capital and labour in liberal
regimes; analytically it takes for amicability what in reality is dictated by
the structural constraints and contradictions of crisis capitalism. Late
65 Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach, "Korporatistische Krisenregulierung im 'Modell
Deutschland'," in Ulrich von Alemann (ed.), Neokorporatismus (Frankfurt/Main:
Campus, 1981), 158-79 (my translation).
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insights into the potentially undemocratic nature of neo-corporatism
(accountability "to the wrong collectivities," and responsiveness "to
the wrong needs") do not substantially change the picture as long as the
assumption is maintained that neo-corporatism may have "equalized
[the] access to policy-making in advanced capitalist societies."66
More adequately, the neo-corporatist paradigm appears as a
"heuristic tool" for the analysis of state-controlled industrial relations
in advanced capitalist societies, and neo-corporatist practice as a "class
concept" aiming at the hierarchical stabilization of such societies.67
Neo-corporatism may operate amicably as long as the accumulation
process is not seriously challenged. When this is the case, however, and
when the concept of market duality cannot be attained through
neo-laissez-faire strategies, corporatism becomes a selective bypass
operation for the clogged channels of liberal policy formation.
5. Conclusion
Both the dualist and neo-corporatist variants of competitive economic
restructuring reveal an emerging picture of sociopolitical fragmentation
in Western industrial societies. Capitalist politics appears to be haunted
by an interrelated set of contradictions which cannot be rationalized
away by the surface evidence of neo-conservative government stability.
What the crisis of scarcity ultimately brings to the fore is an
incompatibility of liberal democracy (form) and capitalism (content)
which has been veiled by the relative success of capitalist expansion.
The politics of fragmentation by selective restructuring (efficiency)
leads to a structural decline of co-operation and consensus (legitimacy).
Paradoxically, every effort to reintegrate the segments of society into a
market exchange relationship seems to increase the number of those
which are no longer determined by it.68 Increasingly, the logic of
exchange has to be secured by the logistics of regulatory support
systems.
While neither a complete dismantling of the intervention state nor a
radical transformation of the capitalist system can be expected in the
foreseeable future, the crisis of the capitalist welfare state seems to
move very quickly from a situation of neo-conservative concern over the
perceived dilemmas of public demand and governmental overload to an
objective condition of structural contradictions and policy immobilism.
Thus, while the present round of conservative governments might soon
become replaced by the previous coalitions of liberalism and social
66 Philippe C. Schmitter, "Democratic Theory and Neo-Corporatist Practice," EUI
Working Paper 74 (Florence: European University Institute, 1983), 55-56.
67 Leo Panitch, "Corporatism in Canada," Studies in Political Economy 1 (1979), 44-45;
and Crouch, "The State, Capital and Liberal Democracy," 19.
68 Compare Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State, 284-86.
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democracy, the latter will be confronted with a bitter heritage which
might reveal the obsolescence of the logic of the capitalist welfare state
even more rapidly: Mitterrand's France has learnt that lesson already.
Both sides—governments and societies, capital and labour, centres
and peripheries, winners and losers—are inextricably intertwined in this
web of contradictions, and increasingly disenchanted with each other at
the same time. A bifurcated society which is at the same time becoming
more disaggregated and interdependent, seems to be the most plausible
scenario for advanced industrial systems at the turn of the next
century—an unsatisfactory result for a tidy analytical mind.

